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Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation:
European Networks of Regulatory Agencies
DAVID COEN Public Policy, University College London
MARK THATCHER Public Administration and Policy, London School
of Economics
ABSTRACT
European networks of regulators in industries such as telecommunications,
securities, energy and transport have been cited as important examples of
the growth of network governance in Europe. Using a principal-agent
perspective as a starting point, the article examines why a double delegation
to networks of regulators has taken place. It looks at how and why the
European Commission, national governments and independent regulatory
agencies have driven the creation of networks, their institutional character
and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe. It argues that
problems of co-ordination were the main factor advanced to justify
establishing networks of regulators. The new networks have been given a
wide range of tasks and broad membership, but enjoy few formal powers or
resources. They are highly dependent on the European Commission and
face rivals for the task of co-ordinating European regulators. Thus in
institutional terms the spread of network governance has in fact been
limited.
Introduction
The s and s saw a widespread phenomenon in Europe of
states switching from direct economic interventionism to delegated
governance – both at the national and supranational levels – to such an
extent that there have been a considerable number of analyses of a
‘ regulatory state’ or multiplicity of regulatory regimes (Majone ;
Coen and He´ritier ; Thatcher a; Levi-Faur ). A key element
was two parallel delegations of powers by national governments to
supranational bodies such as the European Union (Pollock ; Majone
) and to domestic independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) (Radaelli
; Thatcher b, a; Majone ; Bartle ). However, as
policy makers at these two levels of regulatory governance attempted to
harmonise European single market issues in the late s, pressure grew
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for a further round of delegations of co-ordinatory functions to European
regulatory networks (ERNs). Here the creation of ERNs required a double
delegation of powers and functions: one ‘ upwards’ from the newly created
IRAs and a second ‘ downwards’ from the European Commission.
The changing patterns of delegation have been seen as part of a
broader move towards ‘ network governance’ in Europe (see Schout and
Jordan ; Sabel and Zeitlin ; Eberlein and Kerwer ; He´ritier
and Lehmkuhl in this issue; Christiansen ), itself linked to literature
on policy networks (see Marsh and Rhodes ; Rhodes ; Sabatier
) and recent work on new forms of ‘ international market govern-
ance’ (see Slaughter ; Coen and Thatcher ). In the field of
regulation, three key elements of network governance can be set out here.
One is the linkage of actors from different institutional levels – national,
EU and international – and both the public and the private sector in a
form of sectoral governance (see He´ritier and Lehmkuhl in this issue;
Pierre and Peters ). A second is a shift of power from previously
well-established levels to organisations or individuals whose main role is
linking and co-ordinating actors (Schout and Jordan ; Jordan,
Wurzel and Zito ; Peters ). A third element involves a change in
the mode of governance, away from hierarchy and towards consultation,
negotiation and soft law (Sabel and Zeitlin ; Hudson and Maher
; Eberlein and Grande ; Kaiser and Prange ). In the context
of these governance discussions, ERNs have created much excitement,
with claims that they form part of moves towards ‘ network governance’
in regulation (Eberlein ; Eberlein and Grande ).
This article examines why the European Commission, national gov-
ernments and independent regulatory agencies have accepted or indeed
driven the creation of these networks of regulators, their institutional
character and their implications for regulatory governance in Europe.
Taking a principal-agent perspective as a starting point for the formal
analysis of powers and functions delegated by the European Commission
and IRAs, the central argument is that the networks represent a new
round of double delegations. They are designed to respond to the
multiplication of regulators and their uneven development by co-
ordinating implementation of regulation by member states. But, at the
formal level, the new European networks of regulators remain highly
constrained by existing actors. In particular, the European Commission
and national regulators maintain many controls over the networks, which
lack resources and rights of initiative. Such shadows of government
potentially limit the innovative scope of ERNs (He´ritier and Lehmkuhl,
in this issue) and raise important questions about their ability to evolve
into strong regulatory bodies (Sabel and Zeitlin ). The weakness of
the networks and the controls of their principals help to explain why
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double delegation was agreed to by both national and EU actors: they
transferred only limited powers and retained many controls over ERNs.
It also suggests that, since their formal institutional position is weak, if the
networks are to have an impact on regulatory governance in Europe,
they must either develop informal resources and influence after formal
delegation has taken place (Sabel and Zeitlin ; Coen and Doyle )
and/or gain new powers through new delegations in order to evolve
into more powerful regulatory bodies (Majone ; Thatcher and
Coen ). In formal terms, analysis of European regulatory networks
shows that ‘ network governance’ remains very limited in EU economic
regulation.
The article begins with traditional analyses of delegation in Europe
and then sets out the principal-agent framework that will be applied by
the empirical work on ERNs. Thereafter it examines the pressures and
problems that led to the creation of ERNs, before using principal-agent
theory to chart the double delegation to ERNs and offering a systematic
analysis of their functions, powers, resources and rivals. The conclusion
links the findings back to arguments about network governance in
Europe, as well as pointing to further research that is needed given the
limits of the principal-agent framework. The article uses detailed case
studies of the two most powerful and well-established ERNs, since they
offer the maximum degree of delegation: the European Regulators
Group for telecommunications and CESR (the Committee of European
Securities Regulators) for securities. Similar developments have been
observed in energy and data protection (Eberlein and Newman ), but
these are weaker ERNs than our two cases, which therefore offer a good
test for the position of such networks.
The logic of double delegation in European regulation
European regulation has been transformed by a series of delegations. At
the supranational level, European states have given the EU progressively
greater powers to extend its regulatory activities (Majone ;
Franchino ). Using these powers, EU sectoral regulatory regimes
have grown in major markets previously largely immune from EU action,
such as telecommunications, financial services, electricity, gas, railways,
postal services and food safety (see Humphreys and Simpson ;
Bulmer et al. ). EU regimes involve detailed EU regulation, notably:
liberalisation through ending the right of member states to maintain
‘ special and exclusive rights’ for certain suppliers; and ‘ re-regulation’, i.e.
EU rules governing competition, ranging over a vast array of matters,
such as interconnection of networks, access to infrastructure and univer-
sal service. At the national level, governments have created new IRAs,
Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation 
both sectoral bodies and general authorities, and/or have strengthened
existing IRAs (Thatcher b, a; Coen and He´ritier ; Gilardi
, ; Levi-Faur ). IRAs are legally and organisationally
separated from government departments and suppliers, are headed by
appointed members who cannot be easily dismissed before the end of
their terms and have their own staff, budgets and internal organisational
rules (Thatcher ).
In such a context of delegation to both the EU and IRAs, from the late
s onwards a further set of double delegations has taken place to
European regulatory networks (ERNs). As will be described in greater
detail below, these networks straddle national and supranational levels of
regulation, since they comprise national IRAs from all EU member
states, as well as the European Commission. Established through EU law
that gives them functions, they are hybrid bodies that link the EU and
national levels, and indeed bring together two sets of agents from
previous delegations, namely IRAs and the Commission. They are given
the task of co-ordinating regulators and increasing consistency of
regulation across the EU. They appear to offer an important move
towards formal network governance, one that goes beyond pre-existing
delegations and/or the reliance on soft law in informal European
networks.
How can delegation in European governance, including to ERNs, be
analysed? One approach is to use principal-agent theories. These explain
delegation by elected politicians to non-majoritarian institutions in terms
of the advantages gained by insulating IRAs from political pressures and
their ability to perform functions for elected politicians (Thatcher
and Stone Sweet ; Bendor, Glazer and Hammond ; Weingast
and Moran ). Principal-agent theory has been applied to delegation
to regulatory bodies in Europe (Thatcher b, ; Pollack ;
Gilardi ; Majone ). It is argued that governments have delegated
both to IRAs nationally and to the EU to enhance credible commitment,
especially in sectors such as utilities, where governments seek outside
investment or other long-term commitments but where other actors such
as investors fear that governments will renege on promises (see Levy and
Spiller ). Another reason has been to shift blame for unpopular or
difficult decisions (Egan ). A third factor has been to increase
efficiency, especially in domains that are complex and technical (Majone
). All of the above have at various times been used as rationales for
delegation to EU agencies (Pollack ; Franchino ) and have
emerged to a greater or lesser extent in the recent debates surrounding
ERNs.
However, principal-agent theory points out that delegation is a
variable. Principals choose the extent of delegation and which specific
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powers are given to their agents. Equally, they maintain controls over the
agent, such as appointments, budgetary and staffing resources and the
ability to overturn agents’ decisions. Indeed, principals will be highly
concerned to minimise ‘ agency loss’ (i.e. agents acting against the
preferences of the principal) through ‘ shirking’ and ‘ slippage’. They will
seek to design institutions to minimise such agency losses.
In light of the above, we see that principal-agent theory is a useful tool
with which to perform an initial analysis of the rise of ERNs for four
reasons. Firstly, ERNs were created explicitly by IRAs and the European
Commission. Principal-agent theory’s interest-based approach directs us
to examine why these actors have chosen to delegate and offers a range
of possible reasons to explain delegation. Secondly, the EU’s legalised
nature means that delegation of powers requires a legal basis. Since the
formal institutional position of ERNs is set out, including their powers
and the controls over them, principal-agent analysis can be used to
examine their formal independence. Thirdly, application of principal-
agent theory requires definition of principals and agents. Hence it
necessitates a careful study of who is delegating and who wields controls,
a central issue in a complex polity such as the EU, especially for ERNs,
which are children of multiple parents (governments, IRAs and the
European Commission). Finally, the principal-agent framework under-
lines the importance of institutional design since principals will be highly
concerned with post-delegation events and are expected to mould their
initial choices accordingly.
But principal-agent tools must be wielded with care, and the limita-
tions of the approach understood in analysing delegation (see Coen and
Thatcher ). In particular, it is based on a rational choice conception
of institutions, which it presents as consciously and explicitly designed;
hence it excludes non-rational strategies such as copying or the evolution
of institutions (see McNamara ). Secondly, and closely linked, it
focuses on the formal structure of delegation, leaving aside informal
resources and controls. Thirdly, it examines post-delegation behaviour
through the rather narrow prism of formal principals and agents and
agency loss. It omits other actors in the ‘ regulatory space’ who may be of
great importance in the governance structures of the ERNs (Scott )
and may fail to allow for the fact that delegating actors are also active
members of the newly created bodies. It also downplays post-delegation
behaviour that may alter the original delegation (Coen and Thatcher
). One example of such behaviour is the alteration of formal
delegation driven by endogenous factors such as learning or the
development of expertise, or exogenous factors such as technological
and economic developments or external coercion (Sabel and Zeitlin
). Finally, formal institutions are overlaid with informal linkages,
Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation 
such as policy or epistemic communities/networks. These may modify
behaviour within a given formal institutional framework, due to factors
such as learning or new resources, representing a form of renegotiation
of the original ‘ contract’ or formal delegation (Coen and He´ritier
).
All of the above caveats are important if we are to understand the
post-delegation phase of the ERNs and potential evolutionary trajectories
of new market governance. Hence principal-agent analyses can offer a
starting point, not an end point, for analysis. However, it is difficult to
analyse post-delegation factors such as learning or the impact of
exogenous changes without a sound understanding of the initial delega-
tion. Equally, policy communities or networks operate within formal
institutional frameworks or under the ‘ shadow of hierarchy’ that sets the
allocation of powers and sanctions (He´ritier and Lehmkuhl, in this issue).
Thus, understanding developments in delegation involves starting with
the reasons for institutional changes and the formal framework that is put
in place.
The spread of regulatory networks in Europe
EU regulation is implemented at the national level, not by the European
Commission which has low numbers of staff and little in the way of
financial resources. National regulatory authorities (NRAs) are respon-
sible for implementing EU legislation at the national level. NRAs can be
governments or independent sectoral regulators (the IRAs). Since much
regulation concerning liberalisation and re-regulation is based on EU
legislation (albeit transposed into national law), NRAs in practice end up
implementing and interpreting much EU regulation.
However, EU regulation has said relatively little about the institutional
framework for the implementation of regulation within member states.
It has not insisted that NRAs be IRAs and hence independent of
government, nor has it laid down rules for the institutional form or
powers of NRAs. Instead, it has confined itself to insisting that regulatory
organisations be separate from suppliers, that they follow certain
decision-making principles such as ‘ fairness’ and transparency and that
they have adequate resources to fulfil their EU-created legal duties.
This initial European regulatory regime contained two batches of
delegation. One involved national governments delegating responsibili-
ties to the EU which then delegated implementation to NRAs, notably
IRAs. The other involved national governments delegating to IRAs
(Thatcher b). However, IRAs now have two sources of delegated
tasks – both from the EU, since they are NRAs responsible for
implementing EU legislation, and from national governments – and
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hence two principals (of Egeberg ). Principal-agent analysis under-
lines that this situation could create problems for these two principals in
controlling their common agent (IRAs). Since it emphasises the impor-
tance of institutional design for IRA behaviour, it also points to the likely
cross-national differences in implementation arising from the lack of EU
regulation on the institutional form of NRAs.
Indeed, the evidence points to the existence of such difficulties.
Co-ordination of different national regulators in implementing EU
regulation was encouraged via informal agreements and working groups
at the EU level, but the Commission struggled to establish regulatory
norms and best practice. Moreover, IRAs differed in terms of their age,
powers, autonomy, finances and staffing (Coen ; Thatcher ;
Coen and He´ritier ; Bo¨llhoff ), as their institutional design and
creation varied from one country to another. In fact, after twenty years
of deregulation and liberalisation, we still observe diverse regulatory
principles and different relationships between IRAs, elected politicians
and suppliers (Thatcher a b). Implementation of all public
policies faces problems of agency loss, as IRAs and governments putting
policies into practice enjoy discretion and the ability to alter a policy’s
original aims, but these features were magnified in the case of the EU,
because legislation is broad and EU directives are binding on member
states as to their aims but not the means of achieving them. In addition,
the Commission’s limited resources make oversight of IRAs difficult,
indeed largely ruling out any ‘ police patrol’ strategy (McCubbins and
Schwartz ).
Given difficulties in implementing EU regulation, calls were made in
the s for independent ‘ Euro-regulators’ – i.e. EU-level bodies insu-
lated from member states and separate from the Commission (Majone
, ; Dehousse ). While arguments based on co-ordinating the
European single market, international competitiveness and increasing
integration encouraged many economists to call for a single European
regulator, the political reality meant that it was unlikely to occur. Firstly
and most importantly, national governments were reluctant to create
such a body, even in telecommunications, the sector with the most
advanced ‘ partnership’ between member states and the European
Commission. Their opposition was firmly rooted in questions of sover-
eignty and control of political economy issues such as universal service
and national champions. However, equally significant was the unwilling-
ness on the part of politicians to open up the single market and
Maastricht treaties – with the very real risk of the treaties unravelling.
Finally, on the practical side, and at a time of smaller government and
worries about the creeping competences of the European Commission,
member states were unwilling to fund and staff an EU regulator. Running
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parallel with this lack of ‘ political will’ was the fear of most suppliers
about the remoteness of a Euro-regulator and about losing a local IRA
(Coen and He´ritier ). Equally, the Commission was concerned about
a transfer of powers to a Euro-regulator, and the powers that it could
delegate were limited by the legal doctrine of ‘ non-delegation’ (the
‘ Meroni Doctrine’; see Majone ).
As an alternative to Euro-regulators and in line with broader moves
to encourage ‘ the open method of co-ordination’ and subsidiarity (see
European Commission b), European regulatory co-ordination has
been encouraged and fostered through the formation of formal and
informal horizontal networks of regulators (Coen and Doyle ;
Eberlein and Newman ). Initially, these involved informal fora of
sectoral public and private actors, who met infrequently and had no
formal powers or organisation. Examples include the European Electricity
Regulation Forum (the Florence Forum, started ), and one year later
the European Gas Regulation Forum (the Madrid Forum) (see Eberlein
). Thereafter, informal groups of national IRAs (NIRAs) were
established, such as the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) for tele-
communications in , FESCO (the Forum of European Securities
Commissions ) and the CEER (Council of European Energy Regula-
tors ). Both types of network were groups set up by national IRAs
through memoranda of understanding; they lacked legal powers or
functions. They were added to highly intergovernmental bodies such as
the CEPT (Conference of European Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations), established in , whose membership goes beyond
that of the EU.
However, the early s saw further moves that involved greater
formalisation of networks and a further set of delegations through the
establishment of ERNs. The ERNs are considerably more formalised and
involve greater delegation than the other networks (many of which
continue to exist alongside them). They were set up by EU legislation
(usually decisions) in key sectors such as telecommunications, financial
services and energy. Their legal basis sets out their functions, composition
and powers. They are composed of public officials from member states,
in contrast to the fora. Equally, the Commission has a significant role,
with rights to attend meetings, unlike groups of NIRAs such as the IRG
and CEER. They are given tasks of co-ordinating national regulatory
authorities through functions such as providing ‘ technical’ advice to the
Commission, consulting the industry monitoring compliance with EU
regulation, and establishing norms and benchmarks, which are forms
of soft law. However, in pushing for the creation of the ERN, the
Commission, under pressure from the IRAs and the European Parlia-
ment, made a number of important concessions on its right of veto over
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the decisions of IRAs concerning regulatory harmonisation remedies
(Coen and Doyle ).
Figure  summarises major networks in a ‘ hard’ to ‘ soft’ continuum,
where ‘ hard’ refers to greater powers and formalisation of position. As
can be seen, ERNs represent a considerable move away from inter-
governmental bodies such as the CEPT. Moreover, in the past ten years
several ERNs were created; Table  summarises the key developments.
It should be noted that there are continuing debates about the
evolution of institutions for regulatory co-ordination (see Thatcher and
Coen ). In particular, in attempting to co-ordinate the single market,
ERNs have found themselves caught between the objectives of their two
principals. At the European level we have the Commission pushing for
greater consistency of interpretation, greater harmonisation and more
monitoring of regulatory activity proposals. Conversely, the IRAs, while
recognising the benefits of regulatory convergence and best practice
within the single market, have tended to look to their domestic constitu-
encies and have in the past sought to limit their involvement in the
ERNs. The above tension illustrates the risks involve in this double
F . Classiﬁcation of networks from ‘ hard’ to ‘ soft’
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T . European regulatory networks
CESR ERG ERGEG CEOPS CEBS EPRA
Name Committee of European
Securities Regulators
European Regulators
Group (for Telecom-
munications)
European Regula-
tors Group for Elec-
tricity and Gas
Committee of Euro-
pean Insurance and
Occupational Pen-
sions’ Supervisors
Committee of
European Bank-
ing Supervisors
European Platform
of Regulatory
Authorities (broad-
casting)
Creation Created in June 
as a ‘ less bad option’
than a European securities
regulator, as part of the
Lamfalussy process.
Created in July  to
balance the increased
delegation of decision-
making to NRAs, and
ensure implementation
as close as possible to
the market in the mem-
ber states.
Created in Novem-
ber  to advise
and consult on the
achievement of the
single market in
energy.
Created in late 
after the extension
of the Lamfalussy
process to banking
and insurance.
Created in late
 after the
extension of the
Lamfalussy pro-
cess to banking
and insurance.
Created in April
 for discussion
between regulatory
authorities especially
broadcasting.
Role To improve co-ordination
among European securities
regulators, act as an advi-
sory group to assist the
Commission and work to
ensure better implementa-
tion of community legis-
lation in the Members’
States; includes a role in
helping draft secondary
legislation.
To improve co-
ordination between
NRAs in electronic
communications and to
advise the Commission
on related matters.
Similar to ERG but
for electricity and
gas.
Same as CESR
except for insurance
regulators.
Same as CESR
except for bank-
ing regulators.
To act as a forum
for regulators.
mainly broadcasting;
no binding powers.
Relationship with
European
Commission
A representative of the
Commission attends meet-
ings except where they are
deemed confidential by
members.
Creation of ERG was
first time EC had for-
mal involvement with
NRAs’ implementation
of EU directives.
Commission can
attend meetings and
inform European
Parliament of
ERGEG’s work .
As for CESR. As for CESR. The Commission
and the Council are
permanent observ-
ers; European Com-
mission contributes
substantially to the
EPRA budget.

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delegation to ERNs. As a result, discussions of Euro-regulators or
strengthened ERNs have been revived in sectors such as telecommuni-
cations and energy. Thus, for instance, Information Commissioner
Vivien Reding stated that: ‘ For me it is clear that the most effective and
least bureaucratic way to achieve a real level playing field for telecom
operators across the EU would . . . be by an independent European
telecom authority’ (Financial Times,  November ). Equally, the
Commission in its December  green paper on energy (European
Commission ) put forward the idea of a Euro-regulator in the
context of increasing fears over energy security and a desire to promote
cross-border links and competition.
While justification for the creation of Euro-regulators continues to
focus on regulatory efficiency and greater top-down co-ordination, many
real political and economic barriers to their creation continue to exist.
Under such conditions the strengthening and altering of the ERNs’
functions and powers remains a credible governance alternative and
needs to be better understood. Thus, the focus in this paper is on ERNs
and the two most established and most important, CESR and the ERG.
Looking at these two bodies in detail helps us explain who delegated
to ERNs and why, and their significance for changes in European
regulatory governance.
ERNs in telecommunications and securities: the establishment of CESR and the
ERG
CESR arose directly from the Lamfalussy commission, which was set up
by the European Commission and national governments to aid the
creation of the single market in financial services and notably for the 
Financial Services Action Plan (European Commission b). The
initial report suggested the creation of a ‘ regulators’ group’, which was
more palatable for respondents to the Lamfalussy consultation than a
European securities regulator. The Lamfalussy report noted the draw-
backs of the existing regulators’ committee, FESCO, which had no
official status, worked by consensus, and had non-binding recommenda-
tions. Interestingly, FESCO itself advocated the creation of a more
formal regulators’ committee that could be involved in the legislative
process, offering evidence that national IRAs were in favour of CESR
(FESCO : ). The final Lamfalussy report proposed the establish-
ment of CESR, which would both act as an advisory committee to the
European Commission and aid in bringing together IRAs and prac-
titioners to ensure more consistent implementation of Community law.
The decision to establish a new body was taken by all the EU
institutions. Thus, an ECOFIN Council communication of November
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 confirmed its support for the creation of a regulators’ body, but also
asked it to perform a role when particularly sensitive issues were
concerned (ECOFIN Council : Annex , ). A European Council
Presidency communication of December  also supported the crea-
tion of a regulators’ body as a part of the Lamfalussy process, although
it noted that harmonisation of national regulatory functions would be a
desirable prerequisite (Ibid: ). The European Parliament was con-
cerned about inadequate supervision of delegated legislation comitology
procedures (European Parliament ), but did not attempt to block the
establishment of CESR. CESR was then set up as ‘ an independent
advisory group on securities in the Community’ by a Commission
decision in  (European Commission a).
Many parallels can be found between the creation of CESR and that
of the ERG. During the s, several proposals were made for a
European telecoms regulator, including one by the Commission. Firms
were divided: newer operators hoped for the creation of a single
regulator, but existing suppliers were concerned that centralisation of
regulation across the EU might damage their commercial prospects. But
ideas of a Euro-regulator were rejected by member states.
Instead, the Commission turned to the idea of a less prominent and
powerful body. The genesis of the ERG lay in the Commission’s 
Communications Review, which looked at updating and unifying the
various pieces of EU legislation in telecommunications that had accrued
over the previous fifteen years. A Commission communication (European
Commission a) of November  mooted the idea of increased
co-ordination of NRAs’ decisions at European Union level. It claimed
that stronger EU-wide co-ordination was necessary since the NRAs
would be delegated more power by the new regulatory framework. The
communication also noted that existing procedures for co-operation with
the CEPT had not worked satisfactorily. The CEPT was an existing
organisation run through consensus and in an intergovernmental man-
ner: that is, without binding powers on its national members, and often
concerned with standard setting rather than liberalisation and regulation
of competition. Initially, a High-Level Communications Group involving
the Commission and NRAs was established under the telecommuni-
cations Framework Directive (European Parliament and Council ) to
help improve the consistent application of Community legislation and
maximise the uniform application of national measures. However, a short
Commission decision soon replaced it with a European regulators group
for electronic communications networks and services in July 
(European Commission : ).
The history of CESR and the ERG underlines the earlier general
points made about ERNs. Firstly, their establishment was closely linked
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to implementing EU regulation. They flowed from perceived difficulties
of introducing the single market at the national level and co-ordinating
a host of diverse NRAs. Secondly, ERNs followed the rejection of ideas
of Euro regulators. They represented a response to co-ordination
problems – i.e. delegation to increase efficiency – without creating a new
supranational body. Thirdly, they were proposed by the Commission or
Commission-created bodies, accepted by national governments and
IRAs, then set up formally by Commission decision. They are the fruit of
an agreement between several actors.
The institutional design of ERNs: composition, functions, powers, resources and
rivals
CESR and the ERG appear to provide a good example of a movement
towards network governance. However, analysis of the institutional
design reveals the weaknesses of the new ERNs and the strength of their
principals, namely the European Commission and national governments
and regulators. The membership of CESR and the ERG is wide and
ambiguous, making autonomous action difficult. The two ERNs are
given very broad functions but few powers. Their resources are limited
and they face rival venues both for co-ordination and for more traditional
governmental functions of deciding through hierarchy and hard law. A
detailed analysis of the institutional design thus reveals limited delega-
tion, many controls and an institutional context that allows policymakers
to work through alternative organisations.
Composition of ERNs
The membership of ERNs is composed of formal representatives from
member state NRAs. It differs considerably from informal networks such
as the Florence and Madrid fora, which involve private and public actors,
including experts and regulatees. The Commission has an important
position but its role is ambiguous, something between a full member and
an external ‘ overseer’. Here, we focus on the ERG and CESR.
The ERG consists of representatives of IRAs from the twenty-five EU
member States. However, eligibility soon posed difficulties with respect to
the degree of independence required for membership. The original 
decision stated that the ERG ‘ shall be composed of the heads of each
relevant national regulatory authority in each Member State or their
Representatives’ (European Commission : Art. ) but also that it
should be a ‘ group of independent national regulatory Authorities’ (Ibid:
Art. ). The preamble made reference to ensuring sufficient separation
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from suppliers, especially if a member state had publicly owned suppli-
ers. This raised important issues of whether an IRA was sufficiently
independent from publicly owned suppliers. The ambiguity was ended, at
least in formal terms, by a new decision in  (European Commission
) that simply stated that eligible IRAs would be listed in an annex
and kept under review by the Commission. Nevertheless, this decision
allowed the Commission considerable scope for further intervention to
decide the ERG’s membership.
The ERG also has observers from EU accession/candidate states and
European Economic Area states. In , the ERG granted observer
status to Turkey and Croatia as EU accession countries. In addition, the
Commission sits as an observer at the ERG. Its representatives are able
to remain in the ERG while confidential issues are discussed. Although
the Commission is represented on the ERG, it also works ‘ jointly’ with
the latter, as for example when they issued a joint paper on anti-
monopoly remedies. So the Commission appears to be both a partner
with the ERG and a quasi-member, as well as being one of its formal
principals.
CESR is composed of one senior member from each member state’s
competent authority in the securities field, with EEA representatives as
observers. The identification of ‘ competent authorities’ with the requisite
degree of independence was a problem for CESR as it was for the ERG.
In , countries such as France, Finland and Ireland all lacked a single
NRA for the entire financial sector, with responsibilities being split
between different bodies (CESR b: ). The Commission is an
observer at CESR, but ‘ it shall be present at meetings of the Committee
and shall designate a high-level representative to participate in all its
debates’, except when the Committee discusses confidential matters
relating to individuals and firms in the context of improving co-operation
among European Regulators (CESR a: Art. .).
Functions and powers of ERNs
The functions given to ERNs are very broad and strongly linked to the
Commission, at least according to the EU decisions that create them.
Thus, for instance, the Commission decision establishing CESR defined
its role as ‘ to advise the Commission, either at the Commission’s request,
within a time limit which the Commission may lay down according to the
urgency of the matter, or on the Committee’s own initiative, in particular
for the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field of
securities’ (European Commission a: Art. ). More specifically,
CESR was required to consult extensively with market participants,
consumers and end-users, and to present an annual report to the
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Commission, which would also be sent to the Parliament and Council.
This role was expanded in CESR’s Charter to cover other tasks such as
reviewing the implementation and application of Community legislation,
the issuing of guidelines, recommendations and standards for its mem-
bers to introduce in their regulatory practices on a voluntary basis, and
the development of effective operational network mechanisms to enhance
consistent day-to-day supervision and enforcement of the single market
for financial services.
CESR was given roles within EU legislation on financial services. The
Lamfalussy process sets out a four-level procedure which moves from the
definition of the overarching regulatory framework through to its
enforcement. The first level follows standard EU procedure, with the
Commission making legislative proposals, based on stakeholder consul-
tation, which are subsequently adopted through the co-decision process
by the Council and European Parliament. This stage also sets out
the implementation powers of the Commission. Level  concerns the
adoption of implementing legislation laying down technical details for the
framework principles agreed at level . Here, the comitology procedure
is used, with votes being taken by qualified majority at the European
Securities Committee (ESC). The European Parliament is also consulted
on the draft implementing measures and is given one month to pass a
resolution on the final legislation where it considers the Commission to
have exceeded its implementation powers. Level  focuses on the
consistent implementation of Community legislation across the member
states. Here, comparisons of national regulatory practices are made and
recommendations for common standards are proposed. The final level
concerns the monitoring of compliance of member state laws with
Community legislation. Where necessary, the Commission can pursue
legal action through the European Court of Justice in cases where
compliance is lacking.
CESR’s involvement in this process relates specifically to the second
and third levels. But its roles are mainly to provide advice and help to
establish non-binding norms, a form of soft law. Moreover, its position is
heavily dependent on other actors in the policy process. Thus, although
CESR has been given a mandate by the Commission to prepare technical
advice in the form of implementing measures, which it does based on its
own formal consultation procedure, level  legislation is adopted through
formal EU comitology procedures. These involve the ESC, consisting of
representatives from member states, acting through EU legal procedures.
At level , CESR is responsible for leading the co-ordination activities.
It can issue non-binding common guidelines and standards aimed at
facilitating the interpretation and facilitation of Community legislation.
It addition, it can conduct benchmarking exercises aimed at gauging
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member state compliance with such standards. This is, in many ways, an
activity that is complementary to the Commission’s compliance tests at
level , though it is ‘ softer’. It underlines that CESR can have influence
through the creation of norms or soft law. But, overall, while CESR has
been given a clear mandate within the Lamfalussy legislative process, it
can shape directives at level  only in so far as it can influence the
Commission, and it risks being constrained by the European Securities
Committee. Thus, CESR’s major roles are advisory and involve co-
ordination of implementation of Community regulation.
Similarly, the role of the ERG is to ‘ advise and assist the Commission
in consolidating the internal market for electronic communications
networks and services’, and to ‘ provide an interface between national
regulatory authorities and the Commission’ (European Commission
: Art. ). It too was asked to ‘ consult extensively and at an early stage
with market participants, consumers and end-users in an open and
transparent manner’ (Ibid: Art. ). However, its mandate is even less wide
than CESR’s in relation to the definition of implementing measures,
as there is no well-specified equivalent to the Lamfalussy process for
telecommunications legislation.
The powers of ERNs are often limited. Thus, for instance, ERG
decisions are not binding on its members. Even deciding its own rules of
procedure require considerable agreement among member states and it
is dependent on the Commission: these are to be adopted by consensus
or, in the absence of consensus, by a two-thirds’ majority vote, one vote
per member state, subject to the approval of the Commission (Ibid: Art.
). CESR enjoys marginally greater powers over its own internal
functioning in that the decision creating it allowed to adopt its own rules
of procedure and organise its own operational arrangements. Neverthe-
less, the Committee has advocated that CESR use a voting procedure
modelled on qualified majority voting where it was not possible to reach
consensus, and this has been adopted in CESR’s operations.
Thus, ERNs face ambitious aims and are asked to consult widely and
cover broad fields. Yet they lack formal powers to impose decisions on
their members and indeed even to organise their own internal
arrangements.
Resources of ERNs
The material resources of ERNs are decided by their members and the
European Commission. ERNs are small organisations in terms of staffing
and spending. Thus, for instance, the CESR secretariat, based in Paris,
started with seven members of staff plus a secretary general, although this
had grown to fifteen by . It also has a small budget, which led to
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comments from Baron Lamfalussy that CESR lacked sufficient staff to
make sure that the new regulatory framework worked properly (Financial
Times,  March ). In –, the budget for CESR was increased by
a third, apparently due to a willingness by members to contribute more;
by  it spent .m euros (CESR : ). The ERG has even fewer
resources of its own: the Commission provided its staff, which appeared
to number three persons in , while from  the ERG secretariat
functions are integrated into the services of the Directorate General for
Information Society and Media (ERG , ). Hence ERNs are
small even relative to the Commission, let alone in comparison to
national IRAs and especially regulated firms.
Alternative decision-making venues
ERNs face several rivals for the functions of decisionmaking, even at the
EU level. The most important are the formally established EU commit-
tees. Thus, for instance, in securities, the ESC has significant powers over
EU legislation. Like CESR, it was set up by a Commission Decision
(European Commission c) after lengthy discussions involving
national governments and the European Parliament. It is composed
of representative of EU member states, thereby integrating national
governments. It acts as an advisory committee to the Commission on
both policy issues and draft legislation; this mandate is considerably more
precise than CESR’s broad and undefined advisory function. In addition,
in level  of the Lamfalussy procedures, when broad directives are being
proposed by the Commission, it acts as a normal EU committee, that is,
one that operates under the comitology procedure and whose approval is
needed for Commission proposals to be passed without going to the full
council of ministers (see Varone et al. ). Thus, the ESC’s procedures
form part of well-established EU comitology, and it has legal powers over
legislation.
A similar situation exists in telecommunications, with the existence of
the Communications Committee (Cocom), also set up by Commission
decision (European Parliament and Council ). It is composed of
representatives of member states and acts both as an advisory committee
and a regulatory committee in accordance with general comitology
procedures. In addition, it provides a platform for the exchange of
information on market developments and regulatory activities.
CESR and the ERG also contend with well-established European and
international organisations that operate through intergovernmental
processes, notably consensus and the absence of powers to impose
decisions on members. In telecommunications, there is the CEPT,
created in , extending beyond the EU to all European states. It has
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played an important role in standard setting as well as bringing together
representatives from national administrations and, traditionally, opera-
tors. Then there is the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
which has members across the world. In securities trading, there is also
the International Organization for Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
founded in , which is composed of securities regulators from around
the world and seeks to set international standards, notably via MOUs
(memoranda of understanding). Its members cover more than  per cent
of the world’s securities markets and include the United States.
Finally, there are rival informal networks of regulators whose existence
may result in institutional competition and venue shopping by those
regulatees that can operate in a multilevel policy process. In particular,
in telecommunications, the Independent Regulators’ Group, established
in  as a group of European national telecommunications regulatory
authorities, continues to exist alongside the ERG. It has the advantage
(for IRAs) that the Commission is not a member and that it is run by
IRAs themselves. Its mere presence raises questions over the level of
confidence in the independence of the ERG with which it competes.
Similarly, CESR’s power (specifically at level ) is constrained by the
ESC, which is legally responsible for passing delegated legislation that
details broad level  directives. In electricity and gas, the Florence and
Madrid Fora include private sector participants, although the Commis-
sion is also closely involved. Moreover, the role of the CEER may
potentially be eclipsed by the European Regulators Group for Energy
and Gas (ERGEG).
Thus, national governments, IRAs and the European Commission all
have venues for co-ordination that are alternatives to CESR and the
ERG. The two networks are in competition for resources, attention and
power with other networks or committees that have their own distinct
institutional advantages, such as greater formal powers or the ability to
work without the Commission.
Conclusion
ERNs have been established in economically and politically strategic
domains, notably network sectors. Using a principal-agent framework,
the reasons both for the decision to double delegate and for the institutional
design of the delegation have been analysed. Delegation was undertaken
by the Commission and IRAs, but after extensive discussions with the
member states and European Parliament. It was justified by the need for
greater co-ordination in implementing EU regulation: i.e. by greater
efficiency. However, the creation of ERNs took place only after another
solution, the creation of Euro-regulators, had been rejected. Whether
 David Coen and Mark Thatcher
ERNs can indeed be seen as a ‘ second best’ method of dealing with
implementation of EU regulation or as a stable point in institutional
regulatory design is a still a moot point (see Thatcher and Coen ).
They certainly appear to be a compromise between actors pressing for
greater European integration and those fearing it, especially national
governments.
The institutional design of ERNs reflects their genesis. They have been
given lofty tasks, but few powers and resources. The European Commis-
sion and national actors (governments and IRAs) maintain many powers
over ERNs. In addition, the existence of several other regulatory
networks and organisations creates rivals to ERNs. This limited mandate
and competitive institutional relationship have created conflict between
the aims and the capacities of ERNs.
What are the implications of these findings for wider claims of the
development of network governance in Europe? The introduction set out
three features of network governance: it offers, firstly, a form of sectoral
governance; secondly, a shift of power from previously well-established
levels to organisations or individuals whose main role is linking actors;
and, thirdly, changes in the mode of governance, away from hierarchy
towards more ‘ horizontal’ and co-operative forms of decisionmaking.
Our empirical findings can be set against these three key features. In
the first instance, the analysis suggests that, in formal institutional terms,
ERNs bring together national IRAs and the European Commission. But
they do not bind together sectoral actors from private and public sectors:
although ERNs are required to consult private actors, those actors are
not full members. Moreover, the ERNs’ lack of powers to impose
decisions on national IRAs and their small size and reliance on the
European Commission (going so far as providing the secretariat for the
ERG) suggest that ERNs are far from offering ‘ sectoral governance’.
With respect to the second feature, few powers have been delegated to
ERNs. Even worse (for claims of the spread of network governance),
existing organisations – notably the European Commission, traditional
EU committees, national governments and IRAs – retain strong formal
powers. There is little sign of a major shift in the allocation of formal
powers in regulation.
This links to the third feature of network governance, which is still
lacking: in terms of the formal structure of decisionmaking, hierarchy
remains strong. In particular, EU committees continue to exist and to
operate through voting and legislation. For their part, the ERNs have
many aspects of a traditional intergovernmental organisation, including
the importance of working by consensus. Indeed, their main formal
powers are linked to that most hierarchical method of operating –
passing legislation – on which they advise.
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Of course, the limits of the analysis should be acknowledged. They
largely flow from the principal-agent framework, which focuses on formal
institutional structures and the relationship between principals and
agents. ERNs suffer from severe weaknesses in their formal position, but
may be able to develop informal resources and linkages. These could
include information, expertise, reputation and trust (Sabel and Zeitlin
; Coen ). If ERNs are able to obtain these resources, they may
wield power that is out of proportion with their formal position.
Moreover, as the regulatory space literature suggests (see Hancher and
Moran ; Scott ), other actors may be more important to an
organisation than its formal principal. For ERNs, linkages with the
industry may supply a vital source of power. Thus, ERNs may be able to
alter governance by going beyond the formal institutional framework.
Nevertheless, analysis of that framework provides good evidence for
why ERNs are subject to criticism as inadequate: on the one hand, they
have been given sweeping goals of co-ordinating diverse national IRAs
and ensuring consistent implementation of EU law across the European
Union that relate to the heart of the single market; on the other hand,
they lack the powers and resources to do so. The EU’s double delegation
to IRAs and the European Commission has failed to resolve the EU’s
problems of co-ordination and implementation. As a result, the issue of
delegation and co-ordination remains a topic of lively political debate in
Brussels and national capitals, with discussion of Euro-regulators in
telecommunications and energy returning to the policy table in –.
But the analysis presented here certainly suggests that network govern-
ance is far from the institutional position of regulation in Europe today.
NOTES
. The project ‘ After Delegation: The Evolution of European Regulatory Networks’ was funded by the
EU th Framework Project as part of the EUI NewGov consortium. The authors would like to thank
all the European Commission officials, national regulators and European network regulators who
participated in the research. A number of people have commented on this paper at conferences at
ECPR, EUSA, Connex meetings at ARENA, Birkbeck and Madison, NewGov conferences in
Florence, ERSC Centre for Competition Norwich and the Centre for Network Industries Lausanne,
but we would especially like to thank Jonathan Zeitlin, Keith Armstrong and Andrew Tarrant for
detailed comments and Adrienne He´ritier and Dirk Lehmkuhl for editing the special issue. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, we would like to give special mention to Julian Knott and Annelie
Dodds for their research assistance on this project.
. However, for an alternative view of delegation based on institutional isomorphism which results in
non-functional delegation, see McNamara .
. There is the important but limited exception of some aspects of competition policy, although this
itself was ‘ re-delegated’ to national regulatory authorities from May  (Wilks ).
. The major exception is FESCO, whose work was taken over by CESR in .
. See, for example, in telecommunications the th report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package – ,  March , http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/information_society/
regulation/index_en.htm.
. Interviews with Commission official, NRAs and ERG .
 David Coen and Mark Thatcher
. See the recent debates in telecommunications (the Commissioner Reding letter and ERG response
(erg.eu.int/whatsnew/index_en.htm) and energy (see Thatcher and Coen ).
. European Commission : Preamble §: ‘ In accordance with the Framework Directive, Member
States must guarantee the independence of national regulatory authorities by ensuring that they are
legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organisations providing electronic
communications networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain ownership or control
of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or services must also ensure
effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or
control.’
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